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From a Liberal Opposition Party to a Right-Wing Party of Power. 
Three Decades of the Hungarian Fidesz (1988–2018)
Introduction
The repeated successes of the right-wing Fidesz group – Hungarian Civic Un-
ion (Hungarian: Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége – Magyar Polgári Szövetség, Fidesz), 
which last almost a decade now, are the result of a combination of various factors. 
Their genesis and essence have a multidimensional character. It should be noted 
that while the first electoral victory in 2010 could have been largely a consequence 
of the discrediting of the Hungarian Socialist Party (Hungarian: Magyar Szocial-
ista Párt, MSzP) in the eyes of voters and the entrustment of alternative power 
to Fidesz, maintaining the dominant position in the political and party system 
in 2014 and 2018 required taking different measures. After 2010, Fidesz had to 
carry out activities aimed at maintaining power, and utilized both the functional 
structure of Hungarian state authorities, as well as the mass media for this end.
The objective of the present article is to analyze three Fidesz electoral suc-
cesses in Hungary over the years 2010–2018 in the light of three decades of 
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existence of this party. This will require referring to the situation in the periods 
preceding the last three parliamentary elections, discussing the results of Fidesz’s 
parliamentary elections as well as post-electoral consequences for Fidesz and its 
activities in the field of state policy, including measures taken to maintain power.
In the methodological and theoretical dimension, we will refer to theories 
regarding the institutionalization of political parties, as well as concepts relating 
to the definition of political parties, based on an organizational criterion1. The 
research methods utilized by us include: analysis and synthesis of data, including 
legal acts and the statistical method.
The thesis of the article is related to the claim that in 2010–2018, Fidesz 
skillfully used both previous experience from its first government period (1998–
2002) as well as legal and propaganda measures introduced after 2010 in order 
to obtain subsequent re-elections in the National Assembly elections. 
Before starting the research, two basic questions arose that we will attempt 
to answer during the research process: 1) How did Viktor Orbán and his party 
achieve electoral success in 2010? and 2) What mechanisms used by Fidesz were 
applied in 2010–2018 to remain in power?
The present article consists of four interrelated parts, the first of which con-
cerns the genetic determinants associated with the Fidesz situation before 2010. 
The three subsequent chapters undertake the 2010, 2014 and 2018 pre-election 
and post-election analysis, when Fidesz obtained the support of the Hungarian 
electorate, allowing it to exercise power in the state.
Fidesz: 1988–2010
Fidesz was founded on 30 March 1988. It was created by a group of people 
connected with the college of the Faculty of Law at the Eötvös Loránd Univer-
sity in Budapest2. The founders included Viktor Orbán, Lajos Simicska, Gábor 
Fodor, László Kövér, János Áder, József Szájer. The organization was illegal at that 
time, and adopted a principle that the upper age limit for its member would be 
35 years3. In 1989, on the conditions set by the socialist, undemocratic regime, 
the Hungarian authorities agreed to the legalization of opposition organizations, 
granting them the form of associations. Therefore, in the result of adoption of an 
1 See: M. Chmaj, W. Sokół, M. Żmigrodzki, Teoria partii politycznych, Wydawnictwo Mor-
pol, Lublin 1999; R. Herbut, Teoria i praktyka funkcjonowania partii politycznych, Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2002.
2 J. Debreczeni, Viktor Orbán. Jeden obóz, jeden sztandar, jeden wódz, Wydawnictwo Aku-
rat, Warszawa 2015, pp. 35–46.
3 Ibidem, pp. 1–46.
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administrative system that granted the state authorities the possibility of strict 
control of political associations and the rationing of their activities, Fidesz initiated 
its legal activities4. The young activists of Fidesz negatively assessed the communist 
period, and therefore demanded that it should be replaced by a democratic regime. 
They expressed this in their first political program adopted in autumn 1988. It was 
there that they wrote about the need to reform the education system, to separate 
the state authorities from the communist party, to adopt changes in the economy 
consisting in the introduction of free market principles5.
With reference to the concept of Marek Sobolewski, we can say that geneti-
cally, in organizational terms, Fidesz appeared as an extra-parliamentary party, 
because its primary goal was not electoral struggle, but a decisive opposition 
to communism. They also adopted a formula of a direct party, that could be ac-
cessed by joining a field structure of the party. Let us add that during its initial 
development the party elaborated a strategy of a strong articulation organization, 
that is, it normalized the activity and structure in its statute6.
As mentioned above, Fidesz appeared as a new opposition organization 
during the liberalization of the undemocratic communist regime in Hunga-
ry together with two other illegal entities: the Hungarian Democratic Forum 
(Hungarian: Magyar Demokrata Fórum, MDF) and the Hungarian Union of 
Free Democrats (Hungarian: Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége, SzDSz). These 
organizations and the reactivating historical parties constituted a platform that 
denied the activities of the hegemonic group, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ 
Party (Hungarian: Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSzMP).
As a result of the deepening crisis of the state, the elite of power associated 
with the MSzMP offered negotiations to the opposition organizations, aiming at 
finding a way out of the impasse. Before the talks began, the opposition organized 
its own debates, held as part of a round table (Hungarian: Ellenzéki Kerekasztal, 
EKA). They were initiated on 22 March 1989 and Fidesz was one of the partic-
ipants. As a result of the talks, the opposition decided to create a single core 
in relation to the MSzMP. However, as the future was to demonstrate, Fidesz 
broke from this informal deal. After the end of national negotiations, which 
took the form of a triangular table (Hungarian: Nemzeti Kerekasztal, NKA), it 
failed to sign the final act of 18 September 1989, thereby distancing the party 
4 M. Chmaj, W. Sokół, M. Żmigrodzki, op. cit., p. 77.
5 Z. Ripp, Unity and Division. The Opposition Roundtable and Its Relation to the Com-
munist Party, [in:] The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy, ed. A. 
Bozóki, Central European University Press, Budapest 2002, pp. 3–39.
6 M. Sobolewski, Partie i systemy partyjne świata kapitalistycznego, Państwowe Wydaw-
nictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1977, pp. 266–280.
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from the agreement that was to lead to the democratic transition. It was on its 
initiative that on 26 November 1989, a nationwide referendum was held, and the 
citizens were to decide on the severity of changes in the political system. Fidesz 
was convinced that the proposals of the triangular table are not radical enough, 
and therefore conciliatory in relation to MSzMP. The results of the referendum 
confirmed the correctness of Fidesz’s position, and the Hungarians agreed with 
the proposals concerning, among others, indirect choice of the head of state, 
which rendered it difficult to elect a communist candidate for this position7.
In the initial period of democratization, Fidesz adopted the formula of a lib-
eral party, which was confirmed by its accession to the Liberal International 
in 1992. Due to the fact that another liberal party, the SzDSz was present in 
Hungary at that time, the possibility of obtaining a wider electorate with liberal 
views could not allow Fidesz to obtain satisfactory election results. This found 
its confirmation in the data from both the 1990 and the 1994 parliamentary elec-
tions. After the first free elections, Fidesz won 5.44% of voters’ support, which 
translated into 21 seats. After the second free elections, it received 5.7% and 22 
seats, respectively8. In the first two election campaigns, Fidesz emphasized the 
necessity of adopting Western European economic and political standards, lim-
iting the role of the state, inspecting the members of clergy for their cooperation 
with communists, limiting the influence of religion on public life, development 
of a neutral education system9.
After a group of activists with liberal views headed by Gábor Fodor left the 
party in 1993, Orbán and the head management team decided to change the 
ideological profile of Fidesz. In the parliamentary elections of 1994, the right-
wing MDF suffered a miserable defeat, partly paying for their leadership in the 
first non-communist government. Thus, Fidesz took steps to transform the party 
from a liberal into a right-wing group. In April 1995, they added the name Hun-
garian Civic Party (Hungarian: Magyar Polgári Párt) to the name. In addition, 
Fidesz signed cooperation agreements with several small right-wing parties. In 
1997, the right wing of MDF concluded an agreement with Fidesz. The process 
that was initiated in 1993 turned out to be successful because in 1998, Fidesz 
7 M. Podolak, Instytucja referendum w wybranych państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej 
(1989–2012), Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin 2014, pp. 329–331.
8 M. Barański, A. Czyż, S. Kubas, R. Rajczyk, Wybory, prawo wyborcze, systemy wyborcze 
w państwach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2016, p. 
162, 164.
9 Z. Enyedi, The Role of Agency in Cleavage Formation, “European Journal of Political Re-
search” 2005, Vol. 44(5), p. 703.
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won the first place in the parliamentary election. This meant the consolidation 
of this party within the conservative family of political parties10.
In the third election to the National Assembly (1998), Fidesz obtained 148 
seats and 38.34% of votes11. Orbán became the head of the coalition government 
consisting of his party, MDF and the Independent Party of Smallholders, Workers 
of Agriculture and Citizens (Hungarian: Független Kisgazda-, Földmunkás- és 
Polgári Párt, FKgP). In its first government, Fidesz attempted to support small 
and medium-sized domestic enterprises, reduce taxes, and limit public debt. 
In relations with neighbouring countries, the government underlined the need 
to protect the rights of Hungarian minorities. However, taking control of the 
media and modifying the electoral law12 proved impossible.
During their first government, Fidesz was able to develop the tactics of 
behaviour associated with the clientelistic strategy that reached far beyond 
raising funds for operations from the state budget. The possibility of deriving 
financial resources from the budget of Hungary allowed for the construction 
and development of a clientele network based on granting lucrative provisions 
to distinguished members and supporters of Fidesz13.
In the 2002 election campaign, Fidesz, for the first time, had to defend its 
achievements against criticism of other parties taking part in the parliamentary 
elections. Even finishing first (188 seats, 48.7% of votes14) it was unable to form 
a government, following political arrangements of other parties. For the second 
time in history the Hungarian Socialist Party (Hungarian: Magyar Szocialista 
Párt, MSzP) agreed with the SzDSz on the construction of a coalition govern-
ment, thus pushing Fidesz to the opposition.
Fidesz decided to use the next parliamentary term to introduce itself to the 
Hungarian public as a party protesting against the liberalization of the state and 
power being exercised by the former communist elite. Steps were also taken to 
strengthen cooperation with right-wing parties within a broad platform led by 
Fidesz, facilitated by the addition of a new part to the party’s name in the form 
of the Hungarian Citizens’ Union (Hungarian: Magyar Polgári Szövetség). In the 
2006 election campaign, requests were put forward for lustration in the state, 
de-communization, and support for the domestic economic market15. However, 
10 R. Herbut, op. cit., pp. 174–179.
11 M. Barański, A. Czyż, S. Kubas, R. Rajczyk, op. cit., p. 168.
12 Ibidem, pp. 169–170.
13 R. Herbut, op. cit., pp. 67–74.
14 M. Barański, A. Czyż, S. Kubas, R. Rajczyk, op. cit., p. 170. 
15 V. Glied, From a  Green Movement to a  Party. The Effect of the Crisis and Democratic 
Movements in Hungary, “Politeja” 2014, No. 28.
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the fifth parliamentary election (2006) did not bring Fidesz success (42.5% of 
votes, 164 seats16) and it remained in opposition.
Several months after the election results were announced in 2006 and the 
social-liberal coalition was recreated, a recording from a MSzP party meeting 
was leaked to the media, on which the PM Ferenc Gyurcsány admitted that he 
concealed the information about the poor condition of the economy during the 
campaign from the Hungarian public, in order to secure re-election. The Hungar-
ians were outraged, both by lack of information on the condition of their econ-
omy, and the lie of the prime minister. Serious riots broke out in the country. 
Fidesz joined the protest action demanding the dismissal of the prime minister, 
the government, and even new elections. Still, this never happened. Therefore, 
for the next four years, up to 2010, Fidesz took actions that were shedding light 
of a party on morality and ethics criticizing the government on it. Any coopera-
tion with the government was refused. Fidesz’s popularity came under test in the 
2008 governmental referendum that concerned the introduction of tuition fees 
for universities and fees in the healthcare system. The ruling coalition decided to 
ask compatriots if they would be more inclined to pay due to the economic crisis. 
The turnout was over 50%, of which 84.1% of citizens voted against increases. It 
meant that the legitimacy of power for MSzP and SzDSz was undermined, with 
the simultaneous success of Fidesz, which urged the Hungarians to oppose17.
Victory: 2010
In 2010, Fidesz entered the election campaign with the slogan “It’s about time!”, 
which was related to the willingness to settle the past, both from the period of 
8-year rule of MSzP and SzDSz (2002–2010), as well as the earlier one, related to 
communism. Just months before the elections, Fidesz proposed some important 
changes in the political system. It criticized parliamentarism because the indirect 
form of representing the interests of society distorted the will of the whole. It also 
considered the possibility of strengthening the president’s competences, which 
was connected with the possible takeover of this office in the future by Orbán. 
There was talk about the need to change the electoral system. However, the afore-
mentioned issues of political changes were not underscored in the campaign, but 
only used in such a way as to demonstrate the party as a supporter of a modern 
16 M. Barański, A. Czyż, S. Kubas, R. Rajczyk, op. cit., p. 173.
17 E. Rytkó, National Referenda in Hungary, 20.11.2018, http://www.aceeeo.org/sites/de-
fault/files/PDF/presentation_of_conference/2008/Referenda%20in%20Hungary_english.pdf 
[access: 20.11.2015]; M. Podolak, op. cit. pp. 367–369.
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approach to reforms in the state. An important issue raised in the campaign was 
the issue of Hungarian minorities. Fidesz believed that one should take into ac-
count the possibility of increasing the rights of Hungarians living outside the 
country, including those with foreign citizenship, but who feel Magyar. In the 
socio-economic dimension, Orbán’s party had to refer to the economic crisis that 
continued for several years in Hungary. They proposed to increase state aid in the 
development of small and medium-sized indigenous enterprises in order to reduce 
the unemployment, which at that time hit the 11% rate. They also announced, that 
shall they win, they will introduce an additional tax on large-format stores and 
companies representing foreign interests18.
During the 2010 election campaign, Fidesz was very aggressive towards 
MSzP. It criticized the ruling party for bringing the country to an economic 
crisis and manipulating public opinion in 2006. Almost every thesis of the left 
was attacked, and favouring by media sought for. Activities of Lajos Simicski, 
who since the 1990s led various economic enterprises that brought Fidesz con-
siderable profits, largely influenced the party’s financial condition and its ability 
to develop and finance electoral campaign19.
Pre-election opinion polls indicated a huge advantage given to Fidesz. In 
March 2010, the Tárki public opinion centre estimated the support for Fidesz 
within 61%, while Századvég – at 56%20. The parliamentary elections were held on 
11 (first round) and 25 April (second round) 2010. The turnout reached 64.38% 
(first round) and 46.66% (second round)21.
Fidesz joined the elections in coalition with the Christian Democratic Peo-
ple’s Party (Hungarian: Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, KDNP). The coalition won 
53.64% of votes in single-mandate constituencies and 52.73% in multi-mandate 
constituencies. This recalculated to seats meant that Fidesz and KDNP received 
263, i.e. 67.88% of the total number of parliamentary mandates. As a result, the new 
government coalition had over 2/3 of seats in the Hungarian National Assembly.
18 S. Kubas, Sukcesy wyborcze Fidesz-MSP i ich wpływ na konsolidację prawicowych rządów 
na Węgrzech, [in:] Polskie wybory 2014–2015. Kontekst krajowy i międzynarodowy: przebieg ry-
walizacji, konsekwencje polityczne, t. 2, red. M. Kolczyński, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskie-
go, Katowice 2017, pp. 341–350.
19 J. Debreczeni, op. cit., pp. 89–110.
20 Tárki public opinion research centre, https://www.tarki.hu/ [access:15.11.2018]; Század-
vég public opinion research centre, https://szazadveg.hu/hu [access: 15.11.2018].
21 Nemzeti Választási Iroda. Országgyűlési választások Magyarországon 2010, http://www.
valasztas.hu/en/parval2010/298/298_0_index.html [access: 9.02.2016]; NSD. European Election 
Database. Hungary: Parliamentary Elections 2010, http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?
study=http://129.177.90.166:80/obj/fStudy/HUPA1990_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=ht
tp://129.177.90.166:80/obj/fCube/HUPA1990_Display_C1&top=yes [access: 9.02.2016].
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Having such a large potential of seats in the parliament gave Fidesz legitimacy 
to undertake reforms in the sphere of the system and the economy. However, 
as the future was about to demonstrate, the scale of these changes and the way 
they were carried out went far beyond the method of democratization developed 
and applied for the past two decades.
The announcement of profound political and economic changes was reflect-
ed in the Declaration of National Cooperation, which the Hungarian parliament 
adopted already in April 201022. It announced the emergence of a new political 
and economic system. As a result of implementation of the announced changes, 
a year later, the Hungarian National Assembly adopted the new Constitution 
(18 April 2011). It left a parliamentary-cabinet model of relations between the 
highest organs of state power, but the scope of prime minister’s competences 
was increased, and the competences of executive power in relation to state in-
stitutions. First of all, the freedom of the Constitutional Tribunal was limited, 
the scope of decentralization of state power was reduced, taking away some of 
the competences of the local self-government. The ideological and axiological 
dimension has been redefined, as the Constitution clearly resigned from the 
22 System Współpracy Narodowej, http://jezwegierski.blox.pl/2010/07/System-Wspolpracy
-Narodowej.html [access: 21.11.2018].
Table 1. The results of the 2010 National Assembly elections in Hungary
Political parties
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Fidesz-KDNP 2,743,626 53.64 173 2,706,292 52.73 87 3 263 67.88
MSzP 1,088,374 21.27 2 990,428 19.3 28 29 59 15.28
Jobbik 836,774 16.36 0 855,436 16.7 26 21 47 12.18
LMP 259,220 5.07 0 383,876 7.50 5 11 16 4.15
Other parties 152,874 3.72 0 196,499 3.80 0 0 0 0
Total 5,114,570 100 176 5,132,531 100 146 64 386 100
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on F. Grotz, L. Hubai, Hungary, [in:] Elections in Europe. 
A Data Book, eds. D. Nohlen, P. Stöver, Nomos, Baden-Baden 2010, p. 873 ff; Nemzeti Választási Iroda. 
Országgyűlési választások Magyarországon 2010, http://www.valasztas.hu/en/parval2010/index.html 
[access: 09.11.2018].
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appreciation of the principles of liberal democracy in favour of emphasizing the 
primacy of the conservative and national worldview23.
The electoral law was reformed, introducing significant simplifications of 
procedures related to voting and recalculation of votes to seats, replacing the 
three-level allocation of mandates with just two levels. On the other hand, a new 
division of the districts was introduced, and Hungarians living outside the coun-
try and holding dual citizenship were also allowed to participate in the elections. 
These last two moves were introduced as part of a tactic for guaranteeing greater 
support for Fidesz24.
During the 2010–2014 term, Fidesz took over control of many of the mass 
media, both by adopting laws in this respect, and buying these that remained in 
hands of the opposition to that date25. In the economic sphere, the tax on medi-
um-sized and small enterprises was lowered, the tax on large corporations was 
increased, private pension funds were liquidated, and the scope of state control 
over the banking system and the power industry was broadened26.
It should be pointed out that the recovery of power after eight years of break 
and its exercise in the period 2010–2014 has consolidated the Fidesz profile 
based on the principles of patronage and clientelism. Fidesz returned to the 
tactics of filling important positions in the state with people supporting it and 
removing these who did not support its rule. We must, however, note that the 
very scale of this phenomenon and the way it was carried out were more radical 
and thorough than in the years 1998–2002. It was also evident that, entering the 
second decade of existence, Fidesz became a personal party27 in which Orbán 
uses interpersonal relations in order to preserve power in the party and also to 
maintain in the position of the head of government as long as possible. Fidesz 
operates based on the strong leadership of Orbán, who tries to maintain the 
conviction that without him the party, but also the state, will not be able to 
function properly, as long as possible.
23 S. Kubas, Negacja dorobku i zdobyczy węgierskiej demokratyzacji po 2010 roku, „Studia 
Politologiczne” 2018, Vol. 47, pp. 119–124. 
24 S. Kubas, Zmiany w  prawie wyborczym w  kontekście przeobrażeń ustrojowych na Wę-
grzech po 2011 roku, „Przegląd Politologiczny” 2017, nr 1, pp. 143–155.
25 Węgry. Fidesz zdobywa nowe media publiczne, Analizy OSW, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/
publikacje/best/2010-08-04/wegry-fidesz-zdobywa-media-publiczne [access: 13.04.2012].
26 A. Sadecki, Państwo stanu wyższej konieczności. Jak Orbán zmienił Węgry, „Punkt Widze-
nia” 2014, nr 41, p. 11.
27 R. Herbut, op. cit., pp. 74–75.
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Re-election: 2014
The next parliamentary elections in Hungary, which ended with the victory 
of Fidesz, took place on 6 April 2014. The turnout in these elections was 61.73%28. 
They were conducted based on the provisions of the new electoral law adopted on 
23 December 201129. The electoral system did not change from the mixed system 
that was in force so far, but introduced many solutions that were beneficial for large 
parties. It reduced the number of deputies from 386 to 199 and by introducing 
the principle of normal majority in the majority segment, eliminated the neces-
sity of a second round of voting if in the first round none of the candidates in the 
single-mandate constituency won more than half of valid votes. The Hungarian 
voter has two votes: one vote for a candidate in a single-mandate constituency, 
and the other for a candidate from the national party list. The ordinance also clar-
ified the voting rules for Hungarian citizens living abroad, who were granted the 
electoral law by the new Hungarian Constitution of 2011, giving them the oppor-
tunity to vote for candidates from the national party list. This procedure extended 
the electorate to a large part of Hungarians living abroad, who, as shown by the 
collected data, constituted the electorate of mainly the ruling Fidesz party (130 
thousand people voted in 2014)30. Fidesz turned out to be the clear winner of the 
election, with 133 seats of 199 in the new National Assembly, and Orbán became 
the prime minister for the third time. Three more parties joined the parliament: 
an alliance of opposition parties under the name of Unity (Hungarian: Összefogás), 
which included the Hungarian Socialist Party (38 seats in total), Jobbik, that is, the 
Movement for a Better Hungary with 23 seats, and the Politics Can Be Different 
(Hungarian: Lehet Más a Politika!, LMP) with 5 seats.
In this term, the government of Orbán faced a serious internal and European 
issue in form of the migration crisis, which appeared in 2015, and was associated 
with a large influx of refugees from different parts of the world. Hungary became 
one of the European countries that became mostly affected by the crisis, as it is 
located on the shortest route for refugees and migrants from the Middle East, for 
whom the destination was mainly Germany (according to available data from the 
28 Hungarian Election Office, http://www.valasztas.hu/dyn/pv14/szavossz/en/napind_e.
html [access: 22.11.2018].
29 A. Sadecki, Węgry Orbána: konstytucyjna konsolidacja władzy, Analizy OSW, 04.01.2012, 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2012-01-04/wegry-orbana-konstytucyjna-kon-
solidacja-wladzy [access: 22.11.2018].
30 A. Sadecki, Wybory na Węgrzech: potwierdzenie dominacji Viktora Orbána, Analizy 
OSW, 11.04.2018, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2018-04-11/wybory-na-we-
grzech-potwierdzenie-dominacji-viktora-orbana [access: 22.11.2018].
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beginning of 2015 to mid-September 2015, over 190 thousand illegal migrants 
crossed the Serbian-Hungarian border)31. This was the reason why the Hungarian 
authorities decided to tighten the regulations on illegal border crossing and con-
struct a barbed-wire fence on the Hungarian-Serbian border, which was criticized 
by the European Union and changed the migration routes and trails32.
Table 2. The results of the 2014 National Assembly elections in Hungary
Political parties
Single-member constituencies The national list Total
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Fidesz-KDNP 2,165,342 44.87 96 2,264,780 44.9 37 133 66.8
MSzP-Együtt-D-
K-PM-MLP33 1,317,879 25.57 10 1,290,806 25.6 28 38 19.1
Jobbik 1,000,637 20.22 0 1,020,476 20.2 23 23 11.6
LMP 244,191 5.34 0 269,414 5.3 5 5 2.5
Other parties 180,559 4 0 201,887 4 0 0 0
Total 4,908,608 100 106 5,047,363 100 93 199 100
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on: Hungarian Election Office, http://www.valasztas.hu/dyn/
pv14/szavossz/en/orszlist_e.html [access: 15.11.2018].33
In Hungary, the decisive stance of Prime Minister Orbán in the face of 
a wave of refugees helped Fidesz to overcome the crisis of support and con-
solidate as the leader of opinion polls, and the migration crisis dominated the 
Hungarian public debate, pushing aside other topics as the prime rhetoric of the 
Prime Minister was in line with social moods that were clearly anti-immigrant. 
An important move by the Hungarian authorities was to order a nationwide 
referendum aimed at strengthening Hungary’s position in the European Union 
in the debate on the migration crisis. The referendum held on 2 October 2016 
resulted in 98% of Hungarians who cast a valid vote replied negatively to the 
question: “Do you want the European Union to decide, without the consent 
of the Hungarian Parliament, that people other than those with Hungarian 
31 M. Gniazdowski, M. Jarosiewicz, Węgierska odsłona kryzysu migracyjnego, Analizy OSW, 
9.09.2015, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2015-09-09/wegierska-odslona-kryzysu
-migracyjnego [access: 3.11.2018].
32 A. Sadecki, Węgry domknęły granicę z Serbią, Analizy OSW, 16.09.2015, https://www.osw.
waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2015-09-16/wegry-domknely-granice-z-serbia [access: 11.11.2018].
33 Összefogás-Unity (alliance of opposition parties headed by the Hungarian Socialist Party).
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citizenship should be settled in Hungary?”34. It turned out, however, that the 
referendum was invalid, as only 40% of those entitled to vote took part in it, 
while, according to the new Hungarian Constitution of 2011, the turnout must 
amount to at least half of Hungarian citizens eligible to vote, so the criterion 
was not met35. The ruling Fidesz that initiated the referendum, encouraged 
people to vote “no”, as did the opposition extreme right-wing Jobbik, with the 
remaining opposition parties encouraging the voters to boycott the referendum. 
“Prime Minister Orbán has failed to make the referendum «a matter of national 
importance» that would unite the society, which – according to surveys – is in 
the majority against the admission of migrants”36. The reasons for little social 
mobilization in the face of the referendum were to be found in the changing 
situation – the vote took place when the refugees have no longer been arriving 
in Hungary for a year. On the one hand, this was due to the construction of 
fence on the borders with Serbia and Croatia, which effectively stopped the 
flow of refugees and changed the migration routes to another direction, and 
on the other hand, a result of the agreement signed in March 2016 between 
the European Union and Turkey, and relieving migratory pressure on Europe. 
Therefore, the result of the referendum held in Hungary did not bring the ex-
pected propaganda success to its rulers. Fidesz’s referendum campaign matched 
the rhetoric of tough opposition to the European Commission and the “Euro-
pean elite”, which Orbán applied since seizing power in 2010. Migration policy 
became another area, where the Prime Minister of Hungary demonstrates the 
public that he is a defender of national interests in the European Union, refer-
ring to “the historical tradition of the resistance of the Hungarians against the 
will imposed on them from outside”37.
During the reign of the third government formed with participation of 
Fidesz, the “stop Soros” campaign became an extremely important area of the 
authorities' activities – that is how the changes in law against institutions related 
to the financier George Soros began to be described. In 2017, this campaign 
began with changes to the Central European University (CEU), which was 
funded by Soros in Budapest, and Soros himself was portrayed in the media as 
34 A. Sadecki, Dyskusyjny sukces Orbána – wyniki referendum migracyjnego na Węgrzech, 
Analizy OSW, 4.10.2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2016-10-04/dyskusyjny
-sukces-orbana-wyniki-referendum-migracyjnego-na-wegrzech [access: 11.11.2018].
35 Article 8 section 4 of the Hungarian Constitution of 11 April 2011, http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/
tek01/txt/konst/wegry2013.pdf [access: 11.11.2018].
36 A. Sadecki, Dyskusyjny sukces Orbána…
37 Ibidem.
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“public enemy”, and the institutions linked to him were accused of promoting 
liberal values and favouring immigration38.
Within the party there was a cooling of relations between Orbán and Simics-
ka, who for many years was responsible for the party’s finances. From 1990s 
onward, Simicska created a financial empire, and part of its profits was used 
to finance party’s activities. He also stood behind the acquisition of opposition 
media and transforming them into a propaganda tube of the ruling Fidesz after 
2010. The relaxed relations between the prime minister and L. Simcard meant 
that Orbán had to search for new sources of party funding.
In the political scene, Fidesz also had to be careful not to be identified with 
the overly radical Jobbik attitude, because that could trigger the outflow of 
a significant part of the electorate. It was challenging, as both parties are similar 
to each other in many different aspects. Hence, Fidesz consistently applied the 
policy of isolating Jobbik. In relation to the left, the party of Orbán had an easier 
task, because despite attempts to unify it, the tendency for its division prevails.
Confirmation of domination: 2018
The next elections to the National Assembly in Hungary took place on 8 
April 2018 with a turnout of 66.68%, the highest since 200639. Once again the 
winner of the elections was Fidesz, which regained the constitutional majority 
of two-thirds of the seats it previously lost in the supplementary elections in two 
single-mandate constituencies in 2015, mainly due to a mixed electoral system 
with a strong majority component (106 elected MPs in the first round, 93 from 
national party lists in a proportional system). This system favours the winner 
(with the support of 49% of voters, the party of Orbán won 67% of seats). Four 
opposition parties also joined the parliament: Jobbik (25 seats), the electoral 
coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Dialogue for Hungary (Hun-
garian: Párbeszéd Magyarországért, PM) (20 seats), Politics Can Be Different (8 
seats) and the leftist Democratic Coalition (Hungarian: Demokratikus Koalíció, 
DK) of former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány (9 seats). One mandate from 
single-mandate constituencies each was won by the leftist Together Party, a rep-
resentative of the German minority, and an independent candidate.
38 A. Sadecki, Węgry: kampania przeciw Sorosowi, Analizy OSW, 5.04.2017, https://www.osw.
waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2017-04-05/wegry-kampania-przeciw-sorosowi [access: 22.11.2018].
39 Hungarian Election Office, http://www.valasztas.hu/en/ogy2018 [access: 22.11.2018]; 
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As Fidesz has a consolidated electorate of about 2 out of 8 million eligible to 
vote, and opposition votes are divided into several smaller opposition parties, 
this allows for domination, especially in single-mandate constituencies, where 
the party won as many as 91 out of 106 seats. In addition, as in the previous 
elections, the rights to vote on the party lists were given to Hungarians living 
abroad, mainly from Romania and Serbia, where Fidesz led an intense electoral 
campaign (380 thousand Hungarians living abroad registered for elections, and 
the percentage of Fidesz voters in this group amounted to over 90%)40.
Table 3. The results of the 2018 National Assembly elections in Hungary414243444546
Political parties
Single-member 
constituencies The national list Total
Seats votes percentage of votes seats seats
percentage 
share of seats
Fidesz-KDNP 91 2,824,551 49.27 42 133 66.83
Jobbik 1 1,092,806 19.06 25 26 13.07
MSZP-Párbeszéd41 8 682,701 11.91 12 20 10.05
LMP42 1 404,429 7.06 7 8 4.02
DK43 3 308,161 5.38 6 9 4.52
Független44 1 - - 0 1 0.05
Együtt45 1 36,561 0.66 0 1 0.05
MNOÖ46 0 26,477 0.46 1 1 0.05
Other parties 0 414,746 6.20 0 0 1.36
Total 106 5,791,432 100 93 199 100
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on Hungarian Election Office, http://valasztas.hu/en/ovi/index.
html#, http://www.valasztas.hu/en/ogy2018 [access: 15.11.2018].
The third consecutive and overwhelming Fidesz victory in the parliamentary 
elections confirmed the party’s dominance on the Hungarian political scene. 
This is the merit and personal success of the leader of the single-leader style 
party, Viktor Orbán, who for the fourth time took office as prime minister. It is 
worth recalling that only in the years 2000–2003, he did not hold the office of 
Fidesz chairman, which was part of an attempt not to hold it jointly with the PM 
40 Ibidem.
41 Hungarian Socialist Party – Dialogue for Hungary.
42 Politics Can Be Different.
43 DK-Democratic Coalition.
44 Independent.
45 Together.
46 Self-Government of Germans in Hungary.
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position. In 2000, a trusted friend of Prime Minister László Kövér became the 
chairman, replaced a year later by Zoltán Pokorni, and in 2002 – by János Áder47.
The Fidesz election campaign focused mainly on anti-migration slogans that 
successfully consolidate the right-wing electorate (the government regularly or-
ganized billboards and media campaigns, and conducted the so-called national 
consultations several times), and a significant role in sustaining the topic of mi-
gration and the resulting threats to Hungary was played by public media, where 
Fidesz has a dominant position (in the last four years, businessmen affiliated with 
Fidesz bought, among others, all regional dailies in Hungary and one of the two 
largest commercial television channels, while the largest opposition newspaper in 
Hungary was shut down)48. In addition, the government of Orbán presented itself 
as a defender of Hungarian sovereignty in the face of foreign pressure from the 
European Union, also warning against the influence of the American billionaire 
George Soros, who according to the government, pays the activities of opposi-
tion parties and non-governmental organizations. In June 2018, the Hungarian 
Parliament passed amendments to the law described by Fidesz as the “stop So-
ros” package49, which introduced a number of restrictions on non-governmental 
organizations, and the amendment of the penal code now states that “unlawful 
help for immigrants” is punishable by up to one year in prison50.
In this way, Fidesz skillfully uses the external threat to create a sense of fear 
and threat of the danger associated with the loss of sovereignty by Hungary, 
indicating that only the party is able to deal with it.
Conclusions
Responding to the first of the questions raised in the introduction (how 
Orbán and his party managed to succeed in the 2010 elections), it must be said 
that at least two factors have been used. First, it was a skillful reaction to the 
social-liberal coalition after the outbreak of the 2006 scandal. Fidesz remained 
in total opposition, presenting itself as a party of moral renewal. Secondly, it suc-
cessfully carried out the process of consolidation of right-wing circles, avoiding 
the fragmentation of the right-wing electorate and successfully won the support 
of those citizens, who were disappointed by the Hungarian left.
47 Fidesz, http://theorangefiles.hu/the-orban-regime/ [access: 30.09.2015].
48 A. Sadecki, Wybory na Węgrzech…
49 A. Sadecki, Węgry: pakiet przepisów antyimigracyjnych „Stop Soros”, Analizy OSW, 
27.06.2018, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2018-06-27/wegry-pakiet-przepiso-
w-antyimigracyjnych-stop-soros [access: 22.11.2018].
50 Ibidem.
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Answering the second question raised in the introduction (which mecha-
nisms used by Fidesz were used between 2010–2018 to maintain power) it 
should be noted that since Fidesz took power in 2010, Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán’s party had a sufficient majority in the Hungarian parliament in the 
subsequent years to implement a reform program covering the most important 
areas of political, social and economic life, serving the consolidation of power in 
the state. These changes meant the adoption of a new constitution of Hungary 
in 2011 and then the adoption of the entire package of bills, including media 
law, new electoral law and filling the most important positions in the country 
with Fidesz people. Undertaking such activities was connected with experien-
ces drawn from the first Fidesz government (1998–2002), when they already 
attempted, albeit with no success, to introduce some of the changes introdu-
ced after 2010. Third in a row (in 2010, 2014 and 2018) Fidesz’s overwhelming 
victory in the parliamentary elections confirmed the party's dominance on the 
Hungarian political scene, with a weak opposition that is neither a threat nor 
an alternative to Orbán’s rule. 
The Prime Minister thus used recent years to consolidate and develop his 
position and political rhetoric on the basis of three main tasks for the state: 
counteracting migration, counteracting the “dictate of Brussels” and fighting 
the “Soros empire”. The thesis of the article on the skillful use of legal and pro-
paganda measures by Fidesz in 2010–2018 in order to maintain power is thus 
confirmed. A package of legal changes made under the rule of Fidesz, skillful 
management of anti-migratory social moods, thanks to which the ruling party 
mobilizes its electorate by creating an atmosphere of foreign threat and the 
domination of Fidesz in the media market allows this party to maintain power 
in its hands.
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Summary: The article presents the development of Fidesz as a party which has been existing for 
three decades (1988–2018), yet the authors focus on the analysis of last eight years when Fidesz 
consequently has won three parliamentary elections. Fidesz turned from youth and liberal party 
in the mid-1990s to a conservative one which let it win elections in 1998. The article explains 
further activities of Fidesz to win elections in 2010, 2014 and 2018. 
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Od liberalnej partii opozycyjnej do prawicowej partii władzy. Trzy dekady węgierskiego Fideszu 
(1988–2018)
Streszczenie: Artykuł dotyczy rozwoju węgierskiej partii Fidesz w kontekście trzech dekad jej 
istnienia (1988–2018). Autorzy skupili się na przeprowadzeniu analizy ostatnich ośmiu lat jej 
działalności, ponieważ w tym okresie partia nieprzerwanie wygrywała kolejne wybory parlamen-
tarne. Ukazano fenomen Fideszu, który z ugrupowania o proweniencji liberalnej i młodzieżowej 
przekształcił się w silną organizację konsolidującą środowiska prawicowe. Ponadto wyjaśniono 
mechanizmy oraz przybliżono efekty działań podjętych przez partię Viktora Orbána w celu utrzy-
mania władzy na Węgrzech.
Słowa kluczowe: Węgry; Fidesz; Viktor Orbán
